A few nights ago I heard Rem Koolhaas talk about the failure of the information strategies of the European Union. There was something slightly surreal–as Americans like to say–about having one of the most notable architects alive show pictures of sparkle-and-glitter alternatives to passports, flags and official catalogues just as the continent seems to be falling appart at the edges. As Koolhaas talked about colors and shapes in Berlin, countries in the south seemed to have slipped into the mediterranean and began to float away . For at least a moment, I had the impression that Italy or Greece were screaming for help, but we could not hear them becuase we were busy choosing the attire we would wear to visit Rome or Athens.
Yet, something remarkably interesting was made visible in Koolhaas attempt at working his way through the visual articulation of European Identity and that is the fact that the identity crisis may not be European at all but rather institutional. Though Europeans–as most foreigners traveling these lands can promptly certify– remain just as European as they ever were even if in a more expansive and increasingly culturally diverse manner, the same thing cannot be said for the Union. The EU seems to be suffering an acute identity crisis. And while the current economic debacle unfolds, the dissolution of trust by Europeans in the institution is resulting in calls for its socio-cultural excommunication: the EU is not Europe. This, however, mostly seems like a matter of political expediency. Either way, the question is not if Europe will remain Europe but rather the question seems to be if the EU will remain a legal resident of the continent, let alone rule legitimately over its administrative affairs.
It is, indeed, all about legitimacy and authenticity and Koolhaas’ reaction and purported solutions are the logical response of a very creative man to the superabundance of misbegotten attempts at expressing the European authenticity of the EU by branding a continental identity. But Europeans are already Europeans and, arguably, do not need the brand since they already own the goods. In fact, Koolhaas response buys into a certain idea of the political that equates identity with brand and political participation with brand loyalty. Much like a loyal customer of Apple who has bought not just into a line of products but into a lifestyle, the good European could presumably be sold a stylized identity at the price of a renewed vow of commitment to all accompanying rights and obligations. But there are many reasons to think that the idea of branding a political project by way of disguising it as cultural identity is itself the problem.
A tapestry of socio-cultural localisms unified by historical aspirations but acutely segmented by increasingly complicated financial, political and socio-cultural conflicts of interests cannot be defined by an overarching institutional concept, visually pleasant or not. The question is not if people are willing to see themselves as part of Europe, the question is if public employees in Greece, bond holders in Italy and homemakers in Madrid can take the Union to represent their interests and talk with their voice in the face of bankers in Berlin and businessmen in Paris for whom the Union must also speak. The question, in other words, is how to produce sufficient overlapping consensus so as to preserve the political, cultural and economic symbiosis of each of these communities. This, I think, is, in the end, the challenge that Koolhaas is also trying to meet. But there is a further question: how to do this while preserving the space for political wrangling in a way that is not destructive of the political achievements of the community in the person of the Union?
Needless to say, this is a mightily difficult task but certainly not an impossible one. The first order of business may be to dispel the idea that the EU can be all things to all people and that it can be so constantly. The EU merely needs to be the voice of its many regional, cultural, social and political interests in which their respected aspirations and concerns can be expressed. For the sake of political legitimacy loyalty must be demanded from the institution and not from the people. And in fact, trying to brand Europe to itself may be, in this regard, entirely counterproductive. Those who already take themselves to be legitimate and committed parties to the project may feel that the exercise of aesthetization of the Union is either superfluous or a cynical ploy–as a friend pointed out–to sweeten unpalatable political agendas. While, on the other hand, dressing the EU with traditional customs of one country or other and parading it in capitals of the continent may exacerbate in the skeptic the impression that the EU will do just about anything to convince the unconverted that it is one of them. A more effective strategy may be to develop a stronger sense of interdependence among communities from the ground up. That is to say, extending the homeostatic ambit–as it were–of each of these communities to include the others.
This form of visible interdependence that binds the life of communities to each other and is capable of strengthening the integrity of the institutional bodies that facilitate this relations cannot be built overnight but built, it must be. Yet, this cannot be construed as a static end but must rather be thought of as a form of political dynamic. Both the development of this dynamic and its achievement, I want to argue–though not here–reside in education. And not in any one form of education but rather in the type of civil education unfolding in all orders of civil society as it expresses a constant and clear portrayal of a common intertwined destiny for the many European communities. And with this we may add that the aim ought not be to convey the intelectual grasp of the mutual necessity and importance of Athen to Berlin and of Berlin to Athens, but rather the sense and certainty of it. The intensity of this ‘sense’ is what ultimately can make the stakes of European health inherently high to its people.
Finally, there is also a question of responsibility. The people of Europe may not be ask to identify with Brusels but they certainly ought to be called to own up to it. After all, businessmen, bankers, homemakers and public employees have all been beneficiaries of its successes just as now they are victims of their failures. But such failures are, in all sorts of ways, their own. And as all other stages in a political process, this crisis is not permanent and its unlikely to be catastrophic. In the end, for better or worse, with or without a Euro, the economic, cultural and political interdependence of these polities will not cease to be and sooner or later–even with a possible contraction or dissolution of part of the community–the question will reemerge as to how to make this interdependence more efficient and practical. One of the answers may be developing better strategies to make the EU more visibly European.
Image via Wikipedia
